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WHAT HAPPENED TO THE AMERICAN SOCIAL
COMPACT?
Robert B. Reich*
As I write this speech, there is much to celebrate about America. The
-economy is surging. More than thirteen million jobs have been added
since the start of the Clinton Administration (for which I, as Labor
Secretary during most of this time, take full credit). The rate of
unemployment is lower than it has been in more than two decades, and
there is no sign that inflation is accelerating. Corporate profits are up,
and the stock market is soaring to record heights. America is also
enjoying a time of relative peace. Ethnic tensions are running high in
certain regions of the globe, but no large foreign power threatens
America's preeminence. For the first time in the history of this nation,
we have no rival on the globe-economically, politically, or
ideologically. We are finally, indisputably, Number One.
The sobering news is that six years of economic recovery have failed
to reverse the trends that began in the late 1970s toward declining wages
and shrinking health and pension benefits for the bottom half of the
American workforce, and toward widening inequality in earnings and
wealth. The real weekly earnings of the median full-time worker are still
below its level in 1989. Even in the robust twelve months from the
middle of 1996 to the middle of 1997, the real median weekly earnings
of full-time workers increased just three-tenths of one percent. But
employer-provided health and pension benefits continue to drop, so at
least half the workforce is getting nowhere. Meanwhile, all the rungs on
the economic ladder are now further apart than they were a generation
ago, and the space between them continues to spread.
Many families have made up for the steady decline by working longer
hours, which the current tight labor market has facilitated. But for most
mortals who do not relish what they do for pay, more hours at work does
not translate into a higher standard of living. At the same time, the
upper reaches ofAmerica-mostly college educated, mostly professional
or managerial-have never had it so good. Their pay and benefits have
continued to rise, and their shares of stock have exploded in value.
Nearly 40% of the nation's financial wealth is held by the richest 1% of
the population. Even taking into account pension wealth held on behalf
of workers, the top 1% still owns 22% of all financial assets.
This tenacious trend toward a two-tiered society is deeply troubling.
Yet, America is strangely immobilized. Rather than giving us the
confidence we need to move forward, the good economic news on
growth and jobs, combined with a rare period of world peace and global
preeminence, seems rather to have anaesthetized us. Future generations
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looking back on this era will ask why-when today's Americans had no
hot or cold war to fight, no depression or recession to cope with, no great
drain on our resources or our spirits-we did so little. Little, that is,
relative to what the situation demanded. Little, relative to what we could
have done. Did we simply assume that the economic expansion would
last forever, and that the disparities would automatically shrink? Did we
deny the problem to begin with? Or had we simply resigned ourselves to
the inevitability of a sharply two-tiered society?
The budget deficit, which has so obsessed the nation, began to vanish
this year even before the White House and Congress reached agreement,
with much fanfare, to make it do so officially. The economic expansion
boosted earnings so much, particularly for those at the upper rungs of the
economic ladder, that tax revenues poured into the Treasury to a far
greater extent than had been foreseen. But rather than dedicate this
unexpected largesse to what has been most neglected and is most
needed-universal health care, child care, better schools, jobs for the
poor who will lose welfare, public transportation, and other means of
helping the bottom half of our population move upward-most of this
windfall is going to the wealthiest members of our society in the form of
the largest federal tax cut on upper incomes since 1981. According to
an analysis by the widely-respected Citizens for Tax Justice,1 almost half
of the tax cut will go to the richest 5% of Americans, and the richest
fifth will receive over 75% of its benefits. Middle-income families and
individuals will pay, on average, $200 less per year, while the richest 1%
will pay over $16,000 less. Most of these cuts will explode in later
years: The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the legislation
will cost $95 billion from 1997 through 2002, but the cost will expand
to $180 billion in the subsequent five years.2 Because of the phasing-in
of the estate-tax cuts and part of the capital-gains cut, and the use of
back-loaded Individual Retirement Accounts, the annual cost by 2007
will be $39 billion-double the average annual cost in the first five
years.
New funds (some $24 billion) will be allocated to provide health
coverage to a portion of the nation's uninsured children, surely a worthy
accomplishment. But this progressive step will be tempered by cuts in
Medicaid to the poor (about $13 billion, to be achieved mainly by
lowering payments to hospitals that treat the poor). Medicare will also
be cut, partly by increasing the premiums on elderly beneficiaries. (A
proposal to reduce Medicare benefits to wealthy retirees was scrapped.)
With almost no public discussion or awareness, annual defense spending
is slated to rise steadily from $269 billion in 1998 to almost $290 billion
1. See Citizens for Tax Justice, Tax Plan Violates the President's "Principles" (last revised
July 31, 1997) <http:/www.ctj.org/htmllfinal.htm>.
2. See Iris J. Lay, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, The Final Tax Bill: Assessing the




in 2002, faster than inflation. But all other discretionary spending will
be held to $256 billion per year, which means steadily fewer dollars
when adjusted for inflation. Fewer resources will be available to people
who are poor or of modest means for education, job training, low-
income housing, mass transit, food stamps, or even inspections of
factories to ensure safety and adequate wages.
If "balancing the federal budget by 2002" were the most important
thing the United States could achieve now, such a regressive tilt would
still be cause for alarm. But it is not the most important thing. The
entire federal budget is an accounting device, and a curious one at
that-calculated very differently from the way private businesses do
their books. A company would never show a deficit in its income
statement for example, when investing in new machinery or a new
factory; these entries would be considered capital expenditures rather
than charges against income. The only debits would be on the
depreciation of the existing capital stock. But in the federal budget all
outlays are considered spending, regardless of what the spending is for.
The most important thing the United States could achieve now is to
get back on the track we were on during the first three decades after
World War 1, toward a more inclusive, more equitable society. We got
off that track in the late 1970s and have veered even further off it since.
A large part of the reason why earnings began diverging then, as we all
know, was the combined effects of two revolutions-one in computer
technology, the other in global economic integration-the combined
effect of which has been to shift demand in favor of workers with the
appropriate education and skills to take advantage of these changes, and
against workers without them. Two minor forces are also at work-the
shrinkage of the unionized segment of the workforce (also related, in
part, to technological advances and to globalization), and the decline in
the real value of the minimum wage; the first force has
disproportionately affected lower-wage men, while the second has
largely affected lower-wage women. But even all of this combined
together would not reveal the whole story.
The real paradox is why, at this juncture in history, the social compact
that America fashioned during most of this century-to help ensure that
prosperity was widely shared and that no one should disproportionately
suffer the risks and burdens of economic change-should now be
coming undone. In the world's preeminent democratic-capitalist society,
one might have expected just the reverse: As the economy grew through
technological progress and global integration, the "winners" from this
process would compensate the "losers" and still come out far ahead.
Rather than being weakened, the social compact would be strengthened.
Nations are not passive victims of economic forces. Citizens can, if
they so choose, assert that their mutual obligations extend beyond their
economic usefulness to one another, and act accordingly. Throughout
our history, the United States has periodically asserted the public's
interest when market outcomes threatened social peace-curbing the
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power of the great trusts, establishing pure food and drug laws,
implementing a progressive federal tax, imposing a forty-hour
workweek, barring child labor, creating a system of social security,
expanding public schooling and access to higher education, extending
health care to the elderly, and so forth. We effected part of this reform
explicitly through laws, regulations, and court rulings, and part through
social norms and expectations about how we wanted our people to live
and work productively together. In short, this nation developed and
refined a strong social compact which gave force to the simple
proposition that prosperity could include almost everyone. The puzzle
is why we seem to have stopped.
Every society and culture possesses a social compact-sometimes
implicit, sometimes spelled out in detail, but usually a mix of both. The
compact sets out the obligations of members of that society toward one
another. Indeed, a society or culture is defined by its social compact. It
is found within the pronouns "we," "our," and "us." We hold these
truths to be self-evident; our peace and freedom are at stake; the problem
affects all of us. A quarter century ago, when the essential provisions of
the American social compact were taken for granted by American
society, there was hardly any reason to state them. Today, as these
provisions wither, they deserve closer scrutiny.
The first provision pertained to the private sector. As companies did
better, their workers should have as well. Wages should have risen, as
should have employer-provided health and pension benefits, and jobs
should have been reasonably secure. This provision of the compact was
reinforced by labor unions, to which, by the mid-1950s, about thirty-five
percent of the private-sector workforce belonged. But it was enforced
in the first instance by public expectations. We were all in it together,
and as a result grew together. It would be unseemly for a company,
whose profits were increasing, to fail to share its prosperity with its
employees and the communities in which they lived. The job of
management, proclaimed Frank Abrams, chairman of Standard Oil of
New Jersey in a 1951 address that was typical of the era, is to maintain
an equitable and working balance among the claims of the various
directly interested groups ... stockholders, employees, customers,
and the public at large .... Business managers are gaining in
professional status partly because they see in their work the basic
responsibilities [to the public] that other professional men have long
recognized in theirs.3
The second provision of the social compact was social insurance
through which Americans pooled their resources against the risk that any
one of us-through illness or bad luck-might become impoverished.
Hence, unemployment insurance, Social Security for the elderly and
disabled, aid to widows which became Aid to Families with Dependent
3. Gilbert Burck, The Jersey Company, FORTUNE, Oct. 1951, at 99.
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Children, and Medicare and Medicaid. "Cradle to grave," Franklin D.
Roosevelt told my predecessor, Frances Perkins, "from the cradle to the
grave they ought to be in a social insurance system."4 And, for the next
half century or so, most Americans agreed.
The third provision was the promise of a good education. The
national role began in the nineteenth century with the Morrill Act,
establishing land grant colleges. In the early decades of this century, a
national movement to create free high school educations through the
twelfth grade for every young person swept across America. After the
Second World War, the GI Bill made college a reality for millions of
returning veterans. Other young people gained access to advanced
education through a vast expansion of state-subsidized public
universities and community colleges. In the 1950s, our collective
conscience, embodied in the Supreme Court, finally led us to resolve that
all children, regardless of race, must have the same-not separate-
educational opportunities.
It is important to understand what this social compact was and what
it was not. It defined our sense of fair play, but it was not primarily
about redistributing wealth. There would still be the rich and the poor
in America. The compact merely proclaimed that at some fundamental
level we were all in it together, and that as a society we depended on one
another. The economy could not prosper unless vast numbers of
employees had more money in their pockets. None of us could be
economically secure unless we shared the risks of economic life. A
better educated workforce was in all our interests.
The unraveling of the first provision, pertaining to the private sector,
began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and it continues today.
Profitable companies now routinely downsize their workforces, or they
resort to what might be called "down-waging" and "down-benefitting."
Layoffs in the current expansion are occurring at an even higher rate
than in the expansion of the 1980s. Companies are replacing full-time
workers with independent contractors, temporary workers, and part-
timers; they are bringing in new full-time workers at lower wage scales
than current workers; or, they are sub-contracting the work to smaller
firms offering lower wages and benefits. Employer-provided health
benefits are declining across the board, and health costs are being shifted
to employees in the form of higher co-payments, deductibles, and
premiums. Defined-benefit pension plans are giving way either to
401(k) plans without employer contributions or to no pensions at all.
Meanwhile, beginning in the early 1980s, American companies battled
against unionization with more ferocity than at any other time in the last
half century. The incidence of companies illegally firing their
employees for trying to organize unions (adjusted for the number of
certification elections and union voters) increased from 8% in the early
1970s to 14% in the late 1970s, and then leaped to 32% in the early
4. FRANcis PERKINS, THE ROosEvELT I KNEW 283 (1946).
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1980s, where it has more or less remained.' The unionized portion of
the private-sector workforce, which had been 35% in 1955, continues to
shrink. It is now 10%.
The relentless drive among American companies to reduce their labor
costs is perhaps understandable given that payrolls typically constitute
70% of the costs of doing business, and that pressures on companies to
cut costs and show profits have intensified. Competition is more
treacherous in this new economy, where large size and low unit costs no
longer guarantee competitive advantage, and where institutional
investors demand instant performance. Yet, it is also the case that the
compensation of senior management, professional, and highly-skilled
technical workers has escalated in recent years. In large companies, top
executive compensation has been increasing for over a decade at the rate
of over ten percent per year, after inflation. Top executives and their
families receive ever more generous health benefits, and their pension
benefits are soaring in the form of compensation deferred until
retirement. Although they have no greater job security than others, when
they lose their jobs it is not uncommon for them to receive "golden
parachutes" studded with diamonds.
The second provision-that of social insurance--is also breaking
down. We see evidence of this in who has been asked to bear the largest
burden in balancing the budget--disproportionately the poor and near
poor, whose programs have borne the largest cuts. Unemployment
insurance now covers a smaller proportion of workers than it did twenty
years ago-now, only thirty-five percent of the unemployed.6 Even
before welfare "reform," welfare payments were shrinking in many
states. In fact, the entire idea of a common risk pool is now under
assault. Proposals are being floated for the wealthier and healthier to opt
out. Whether in the form of private "medical savings accounts" to
replace Medicare, or "personal security accounts" to replace Social
Security, the effect would be much the same; the wealthier and healthier
would no longer share the risk with those who have a much higher
probability of being sicker or poorer.
The third part of the social compact, access to a good education, is
also under severe strain. The Clinton Administration has expanded
opportunities at the federal level--more Pell grants and low-interest
direct loans for college, school-to-work apprenticeships, and tax breaks
for education and training. But the federal government accounts for only
eight cents of every public dollar spent on primary and secondary school
education in the United States; states and localities divide the rest.
As Americans increasingly segregate by level of income into different
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE
OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 84 (May 1994).
6. See LAURiE J. BASSIEE ETAL, THE EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, STAFF
PAPER, 24 (August 1995).
7. See DAvID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 39-43 (1991).
[Vol. 50:1
THE FRANK M COFFIN LECTURE
townships, local tax bases in poorer areas cannot support the quality of
schooling available to the wealthier. Public expenditures per pupil are
significantly lower in school districts in which the median household
income is less than $20,000 than they are in districts where the median
household income is $35,000 or more-even though the challenge of
educating poorer children, many of whom are immigrants with poor
English language skills or who have other social or behavioral problems,
is surely greater than the challenge of educating children from relatively
more affluent households.8 De facto racial segregation has become the
norm in several large metropolitan areas.
Across the United States, state-subsidized higher education is waning
under severe budget constraints, and its cost has risen three times faster
than median family income. Elite colleges and universities are
abandoning "need-blind" admissions policies, by which they guaranteed
that any qualified student could afford to attend. Young people from
families with incomes in the top 25% are three times more likely to go
to college than are young people from the bottom quarter, and the
percentage is rising.
Why is the social compact coming undone-especially at a time when
it is most needed? The reasons relate to the same basic forces that have
divided the workforce. Technological advances-primarily in
information and communication-and global trade and investment have
rendered a substantial portion of the tax base footloose. Capital can
move at the speed of an electronic impulse. Well-educated professionals
are also relatively mobile. As a result, governments are forced to impose
taxes disproportionately on labor-typically lower-wage labor, which is
the most rooted. As technology continues to advance and global markets
continue to integrate, this "mobility gap" will continue to widen,
resulting in wider disparities in tax burdens.
For example, corporate income taxes (which, given the incidence of
shareholding in the United States, are relatively progressive) have
steadily declined as a percentage of federal tax revenues, from 23.2% in
1960 to 17% in 1970, and now 11.8% (as of 1996). Meanwhile, federal
payroll taxes (which are regressive, given that income above a ceiling of
approximately $60,000 is not taxed) have steadily increased as a percent
of federal revenues, from 15.9% in 1960 to 23% in 1970, and now
35.8% (as of 1996).9 State and local tax burdens also have become more
8. Public school expenditures per pupil (in 1996 constant dollars) in school year 1992-1993
(the most recent date for which such data are available) for districts in which median household
income was less than $20,000 was $5,237; in districts where median household income %as
$35,000 or more, it was $6,661. See U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics, "National Public Education Financial Survey," (various yars). See also U.S. Department
of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, The Condition of Education (1997).
9. THEBUDGET FOR FIscAL YEAR 1988, HIsToRicTABLEs 29-30 tbl. 2.2 (1988). For an
assessment of the relative progressivity or regressivity of these two sources ofgovernment revenue,
see JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, THE BROOKINGS INST., WHO PAID THE TAXES 1966-85 (1986). In fact.
the same pattern is apparent in most advanced nations. On average, the standard rate of corporate
1998]
MAINE LA WREVIEW
regressive, as states and localities shift from taxing incomes to taxing
sales and property.1" Stated another way, capital markets quickly and
ferociously penalize any chief executive who pays more than is
necessary to get a job done, and they penalize with equal severity any
governor, president, or prime minister who is inclined to impose high
.taxes in order to pay for social insurance or education.
The market for highly-skilled people is not nearly as instantaneous or
cutthroat as the market for capital, but its effects run in the same
direction. Professionals move out of cities into remote suburbs where
their property taxes do not have to pay for the costs of educating those
in the inner city. They work from home offices or office complexes in
the country. In the extreme instance, highly-skilled people can simply
emigrate from relatively poorer nations, where they are relatively more
taxed, to richer ones, where their tax burden is lower. As a result of the
mobility of capital and the highly skilled, average and poorer working
people find themselves bearing an increasingly large portion of the cost
of social programs. Still, the incomes of most working people have not
risen along with the growth of the economy; indeed, many of them are
concerned with simply keeping theirjobs. Such an environment is not
conducive to a strong social compact.
Yet, even this analysis does not entirely explain the paradox. Today's
wealthy investors and skilled professionals are not merely winners in a
growing economy; they are also citizens in a splitting society. Wealthier
and more fortunate members of society have long engaged in efforts to
improve their community or nation-spearheading not just charitable
activities but also progressive reforms. Why would they now allow the
social compact to unravel? Are other forces weakening the bonds of
affiliation and empathy on which a social compact is premised?
I do not have a clear answer, but I do have several hypotheses. The
first is that Americans no longer face the common perils of Depression,
hot war, or cold war that were defining experiences for the generations
that reached adulthood between the 1930s and the 1960s. Each of these
events posed a threat to American society and culture. Each was
experienced directly or indirectly by virtually all Americans. Under
those circumstances, it was not difficult to sense mutual dependence and
to conceive of a set of responsibilities shared by all members, which
exacted certain sacrifices for the common good. Today, fewer
Americans remember these events or the "social bonding" that
income tax in member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), which comprises all advanced nations, fell from 43% in 1986 to 33% in 1995. The
highest marginal rates of personal income tax among OECD nations dropped as well--from 59%
in 1975 to 42% in 1995. Simultaneously, rates for lower-wage workers have risen. The marginal
tax rates for workers receiving two-thirds of average earnings rose from 32.6% in 1978 to 38.4%
in 1995.
10. See Citizens for Tax Justice, State and Local Taxes Hit Poor and Middle Class Far
Harder than the Wealthy, press release, June 26, 1996 <http://www.ctj.org/html/whopays.html>
(visited Nov. 17, 1997) (reporting regressiveness of various states' taxes).
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accompanied them. Peace and prosperity are delightful, but they do not
necessarily pull citizens together.
Second, in the new global economy, those who are more skilled, more
talented, or simply wealthier are not as economically dependent on the
local or regional economy surrounding them as they once were, and thus
have less selfish interest in ensuring that their fellow inhabitants are as
productive as possible. Alexis de Tocqueville noted that the better-off
Americans he met in his travels of the 1830s invested in their
communities because they knew they would reap some of the gains from
the resulting economic growth-in contrast to Europe's traditions of
honor, duty, and noblesse oblige:
The Americans... are fond of explaining almost all the actions of
their lives by the principle of interest rightly understood; they show
with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves
constantly prompts them to assist each other and inclines them
willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the
welfare of the State."
Today, increasingly, the geographic community within which an
individual may live is of less consequence to his or her economic well
being. It is now possible to be linked directly, by modem and fax, to the
great financial or commercial centers of the world.
Third, any social compact is premised on "it could happen to me'-
type thinking. Social insurance assumes that certain risks are commonly
shared. Today's wealthy and poor, however, are likely to have markedly
different life experiences. Disparities have grown so large that even
though some of the rich (or their children) may become poor and some
of the poor (or their children) will become rich, the chances of either
occurring are less than they were several decades ago. The wealthy are
no longer under a "veil of ignorance" about their futures, to borrow
philosopher John Rawls's felicitous phrase, and they know that any
social compact is likely to be one-sided-they will be required to
subsidize the poor.
Perhaps all of these hypotheses are at work to some degree. But there
should be no doubt that, unchecked, the disintegration of the social
compact threatens the stability and moral authority of this nation. It also
threatens continued economic growth. Those who believe that they bear
a disproportionate share of the burdens and risks of growth but enjoy
few, if any, of the benefits will not passively accept their fates. Unless
they feel some stake in economic growth, they are likely to withdraw
their tacit support for free trade, capital mobility, relatively open
immigration, deregulation, and similar aspects of open economies that
generate growth, but which simultaneously impose losses and
insecurities on them. Some aspects of this backlash can already be
11. ALEXIs DE TOcQuEva.A DEMOCRACY IN AMRICA 146-47 (lHemy Reeve, trans.,
Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, new ed. 1862).
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observed in the resistance shown by the public to renewal of "fast track"
authority enabling the President to move trade treaties quickly through
Congress. 2 Public opinion polls over the past decade have shown a
distinct decline in support of immigration as well, as evidenced in the
anti-immigrant aspects of recent welfare legislation. Note, too, the
"communitarian" movement's increasing resistance to capital mobility.
Social conservatives have recently decried the openings of K-Marts and
Wal-Marts in various communities, charging that they undermine
"community values."
The current situation-widening inequality coupled, paradoxically,
with a weakening social compact-is not sustainable. Those who are
losing ground will not allow it to continue unabated. One of two things
will occur. Either a new, more virulent form of statism will emerge,
which achieves stability at the cost of economic growth. Or, the better-
off members of society will participate in the creation of a new social
compact that permits economic dynamism and growth, but also
compensates economic "losers" and gives them a full opportunity to
become "winners." At this moment in time, when the economy is
expanding briskly and even those in the bottom half have high hopes of
doing better for themselves in the future, such warnings may seem far-
fetched. But history counsels wariness. The social compact is a promise
we made with one another, and we are not keeping that promise when
we can most afford to do so.
12. It is remarkable that not even the current economic expansion has reassured Americans
about the North American Free Trade Agreement. According to a Business WeeklHarris poll
conducted September 3-7, 1997, 42% were in favor of NAFTA, down from 48% in April of 1995.
See Harris Poll: Freer Trade Gets an Unfriendly Reception, Bus. WK., Sept 22, 1997, at 34.
Fifty-four percent of the respondents said they opposed extending NAFTA to other Latin American
countries, and 54% also were opposed to renewal of "fast-track" authority. See td.
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